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RETHINKING  THE  HISTORY  OF AMERICAN  FREEDOM
(REVIEW ESSAY OF ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN
FREEDOM (1998))
MICHAEL J.  KLARMAN*
Professor Eric Foner is one of the most distinguished American
historians  of our  time.  His  definitive  work  on Reconstruction'
garnered numerous awards and has become  a widely used source
among  American  constitutional  historians  and  constitutional
lawyers. Now Foner has written another book that should be of at
least equal interest to the legal academy. The Story of American
Freedom is a massively researched  and extraordinarily  learned
work, which fully reflects the three decades' worth of reading and
thought that Professor Foner has invested in his subject. The book
is  also,  as with  Foner's  other work, beautifully  written.  Every
lawyer  and law professor in America would do well to read this
book.
American Freedom covers virtually every topic touching on the
subject of American freedom from the American Revolution to the
* James Monroe Professor of Law and F. Palmer Weber Research Professor of Civil
Liberties and Human Rights, University of Virginia School of Law. This review essay grew
out of remarks delivered at  a panel session on Professor Foner's book, The Story  ofAmerican
Freedom (1998), which took place at the University of Virginia School of Law on March 2,
2000.  I benefitted from the remarks delivered by Professor Foner on that occasion and am
grateful to him for supporting the idea of converting my panel remarks into a review essay.
I would  like to thank the students on the William & Mary Law Review for inviting me to
publish this essay in their journal.  It was my pleasure to teach several of them during the
fall semester of 1999, when I was the Distinguished Lee Visiting Professor at the Marshall-
Wythe School of Law at the College of William and Mary.
1.  ERIC  FONER,  RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA'S  UNFINISHED  REvOLUTION,  1863-1877
(1988).
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Reagan Revolution. Freedom is canvassed in all of its multifarious
guises-political,  economic,  social,  consumerist,  etc.  Foner  is
particularly adept at capturing  the ironies that characterize  the
story  of American  freedom.  The  book begins with  an American
nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all
men are created equal, yet heavily dependent on slave labor (p. 3).
The  story  ends  with  the  Reagan  Revolution  and  its  reconcep-
tualization of freedom-a  universe in which  the term "Freedom
Fighters" is used to describe anti-Sandanista  guerillas seeking to
overthrow a democratically elected government in Nicaragua, but
never an African National  Congress trying to overthrow a vicious
white  supremacist  regime  in  South  Africa,  and  in  which  an
economic  bill  of rights refers not to providing jobs or subsistence
to  the  poor,  but rather  to  dismantling  economic  regulation  of
corporations, cutting taxes, and reducing the power of labor unions
(p. 321). What appears in between these bookend ironies is too rich
and multifaceted  to lend itself to easy summary. I will not even
attempt such a task here. Suffice it to say that anyone interested in
the history of American  freedom-which  ought to be  everyone-
should read this book.
Indeed American Freedom is so wide ranging and the concept of
freedom is shown to encompass so many diverse meanings that one
begins to wonder if "freedom" really has any bite to it. In Part I of
this  review  essay, I  suggest that Foner's  plenitude  of examples
illustrating the contestability and malleability of freedom actually
suggest that the concept is vacuous. In Parts II and III, I offer a few
of my own interpretations of the book's data. First, I shall suggest
some  possible  explanations  for why particular  freedoms  expand
over time. That is, I shall consider the circumstances and conditions
under which particular  freedoms  prosper. Then I shall turn to a
question that receives surprisingly little attention from Professor
Foner-what is the role of courts in the story of American freedom?
I. THE MALLEABILITY  OF THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
A dominant theme of  American Freedom is the contested nature
of freedom  throughout  American  history.  Professor  Foner is  so
successful  at  demonstrating the  malleability  of freedom  in his-
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torical debates that skeptics may question whether the concept has
any bite to it at all. First, let us consider a few examples of the wide
variety of historical  debates in which freedom has been invoked
on both sides. Then, we can identify the characteristics of freedom
that render it such a malleable concept. Finally, we can evaluate
whether freedom is  so manipulable  as to be vacuous,  and, if  so,
consider the implications.
One pervasive theme of American Freedom is the invocation  of
freedom on both sides  of various  economic  disputes  throughout
American history. Mid-nineteenth-century Whigs viewed freedom
as a product of energetic government  creating the conditions for
economic  growth,  while  Jacksonian  Democrats,  likewise in the
name of freedom, opposed government intervention in the economy
as conferring special privileges upon the advantaged few (pp. 53-
54). Half a century later, during the Gilded Age, this same debate
reappeared in the guise of Lochner  Era courts invalidating economic
reform legislation as inconsistent with liberty of contract, while
Populists and Progressives argued contemporaneously that genuine
freedom  was impossible  without  government  regulation  of un-
accountable corporations, support for labor unions, and some mild
redistribution of wealth (pp. 115-30). This same debate continued
to  rage  another  half  century  later,  as  President  Franklin  D.
Roosevelt defined the nation's objectives during the Second World
War in terms of the Four Freedoms-not  only freedom of speech
and religion, but also freedom from want and fear. Contrast the per-
spective  of Roosevelt's  opponents in the Liberty League  and the
Republican Party who disparaged freedom from want and fear as
New Deal freedoms, rather than American freedoms, and urged
inclusion of a fifth freedom on the list-freedom of private enter-
prise (pp. 227-30).
Foner's point about the contestability of the concept of freedom
in  American  history  is  not  limited  to  economic  examples.  He
contrasts,  for  example,  a  conventional,  perhaps  male-oriented
conception of freedom that sanctifies  a private  sphere of family
autonomy  secure  from government  regulation,  with a  feminist
notion of freedom that demands government intervention against
the unfreedom that characterizes a private sphere in which men use
their disproportionate economic and physical power to subordinate
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women (pp. 80-83). Or consider the abortion debate, where one side
emphasizes the freedom of women to control their reproduction, and
the other underscores the freedom  of unborn children  to live (p.
319).  Or  compare  the  Civil  Rights  Movement's  conception  of
freedom as the right of African Americans to enjoy equal access to
jobs, housing, and public accommodations regardless of race, with
Barry Goldwater's statements in the 1964 presidential campaign
that fair employment legislation violated the freedom of employers,
with  Ronald  Reagan's  declarations  during the  1966  California
guber-natorial campaign that fair housing legislation violated the
freedom  of homeowners  (pp. 314-15). Finally, and perhaps most
strikingly,  consider  the  northern  and southern  perspectives  on
freedom evinced during the Civil War. Northerners, at least after
Lincoln's  Emancipation  Proclamation,  fought for the freedom  of
slaves.  Southerners  equally fought  for freedom-the  freedom  to
regulate their own "domestic institutions" independent  of federal
control and the freedom  not  to be  deprived  of their property  in
slaves (p.  95).2  1  say this last point is most striking because if even
the slavery issue was debated by both sides in terms of freedom, one
is  entitled to  wonder  whether  any substantive  position  on  any
important public policy debate cannot be so defended.
The various examples cited above indicate two reasons why the
concept of freedom is so malleable. First, as Professor Foner rightly
observes, the struggle between positive and negative conceptions of
freedom has persisted throughout American history (e.g., pp. xviii,
53-54,  129-30). Negative liberty is the freedom from government
interference. Positive liberty is the existence of conditions enabling
individuals  to  realize their potential  or accomplish  their goals-
conditions  that  may  be  attainable  only  through  government
intervention in a private sphere which, if  left unregulated, inhibits
the  realization  of genuine  freedom.  Foner  shows,  perhaps  sur-
prisingly,  that  Americans  have  always  embraced  both  these
competing conceptions of freedom. So long as positive and negative
2.  "We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word, we do not all mean the same
thing.  With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself,
and the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do
as they please with other men, and the product of other men's labor." Lincoln's Address at
Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland  (Apr. 18, 1864), in  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS,  1859-1865, at 589 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,  1989).
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conceptions  of freedom are equally valid, freedom arguments  are
certain  to exist  on both  sides  of every  significant  public policy
dispute.'  Women want to be free of government interference with
their reproductive choices;  abortion  opponents want the govern-
ment to guarantee the fetuses' freedom to live. The National Rifle
Association wants to be free of government interference  with the
right to keep and bear arms, while residents of high-crime urban
neighborhoods want the government to regulate guns so that they
may enjoy freedom to walk the streets uninhibited by constant fear
of gun-related violence. The equal validity of positive and negative
conceptions of liberty makes it impossible to choose between the two
sides of these debates solely in terms of the quality of their freedom
arguments.
Second, freedom conceived as an individual right operates as a
"trump" against legislative majorities.4 Yet freedom conceived as a
political right  entails  the  capacity  of democratic  majorities  to
control their destinies through legislation.'  Again, so long as both
these conceptions of freedom are equally valid, freedom arguments
necessarily  will  exist on  both sides  of every  policy  debate.  The
individual freedom of women to reproductive  choice is in tension
with the political  freedom  of democratic  majorities  to regulate
abortion, a subject upon which the Constitution arguably does not
speak.6  The  individual  freedom  of gays  and  lesbians  to  avoid
government  discrimination  based  on  sexual  orientation  is  in-
consistent with the political  freedom of democratic  majorities  to
define the moral bounds of their community.'  Without privileging
or disqualifying  one of these competing  conceptions  of freedom,
equally respectable freedom arguments  are certain to appear  on
both sides of every policy dispute.
If these  two  observations  about  freedom  are  correct,  then  I
wonder  if Professor  Foner  can  be  right  when  he  states  that,
although freedom "is a contested concept, it is not merely an empty
3.  This is one of the fundamental points made in LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARKV.
TUSHNET,  REMNANTS  OF  BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY  CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES  (1996).
4.  See, e.g.,  RONALD DWORKIN,  TAXING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
5.  See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND  DISTRUST  (1980).
6.  Compare  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113 (1973), with Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.  179,221-22
(1973) (White, J., dissenting).
7.  Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.  620 (1996),  with id. at 636,  653  (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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vessel"  (p. xvii).  If  the positive/negative  and individual/political
conceptions  of freedom are equally valid, and thus freedom can be
invoked with equal  plausibility on  either side  of any significant
political  debate,  then  why isn't  freedom  a vacuous  concept,  an
"empty vessel"? Perhaps I am mistaken, but I suspect that by dem-
onstrating the infinite contestability and malleability of freedom,
Foner has proven that the  concept  does  no  serious work in the
various debates in which it is invoked.
This  is not to say, of course, that all arguments about freedom
are  equally  convincing.  It  is  to say  that the  reason  some  such
arguments are more persuasive than others has nothing to do with
their merit as arguments about freedom, but rather is attributable
to the attractiveness  of the substantive cause  on behalf of which
they are mustered.  The southern  slaveowners  who  invoked  the
freedom to take their slave  property into federal territories  as  a
basis for invalidating the Missouri Compromise in Dred Scott v.
Sandford 8  were not making a conceptually  flawed freedom argu-
ment. Protection of property rights against government interference
and insistence upon the limited scope of federal regulatory power
are time honored freedom arguments. The slaveowners' claim fails
to resonate with us in the year 2000 not because  it  misapplies the
concept of freedom, but rather because we no longer regard property
in human beings as the sort of freedom that warrants protection.
Similarly, white  Southerners  who  criticized Brown  v.  Board of
Education 9 as an invasion of their freedom did not misunderstand
the concept. The freedom of local communities to govern their own
schools and of individuals to choose with whom they associate have
long and respected  historical pedigrees. Such freedom arguments
are unpersuasive  to  us today  not because  they misconstrue  the
concept  of freedom, but rather because  we  no  longer  choose  to
respect the freedom  of those who denigrate  other human beings
because  of their race or to defer to the freedom  of local political
majorities to use their power in the service of white supremacy.
Foner's compelling,  if unintended,  demonstration of freedom's
infinite  malleability thus  yields  an important  lesson.  Freedom,
8.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
9.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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much like equality,"  is an empty concept. To say that one favors
freedom is really to say nothing at all. As is so often the case in
constitutional law, one ultimately cannot avoid taking a position on
the merits. Whether freedom is good or bad depends entirely on the
particular substantive cause on behalf of which freedom is invoked.
II. WHEN DOES FREEDOM PROSPER?
Although Professor Foner does not explicitly address this point,
the material canvassed in American Freedom bears directly on a
question  of great importance  to students  of American  freedom:
Under what conditions do particular liberties prosper and expand?"
Let me  suggest three explanations  for why the stock of certain
freedoms  rises over  time. These  accounts  are  neither mutually
exclusive nor exhaustive. I offer them simply as my own speculation
as to why particular freedoms have prospered at certain moments
in American history.
First, a particular liberty may become more attractive because it
is intimately associated with a substantive cause that has gained
popularity. For example,  as Foner notes, during the first third of
the twentieth century, freedom of speech was closely identified with
the labor movement (p. 164).  Specifically, freedom of speech was
generally understood to mean the right of labor unions to organize,
picket, and boycott.'" As a result of the Great Depression and the
New Deal, the political  and social status of organized labor grew
tremendously during the 1930s. It is no accident that by the end of
that decade, the Supreme Court for the first time had extended
First Amendment protection to labor union picketing, pamphleting,
10.  See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality,  95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
11.  Just to be clear, I emphasize that there is no tension between this point and the one
made in the preceding part. The lesson of Part I was that as one freedom expands, another
freedom  necessarily contracts.  For example,  an expansion  of the freedom of gunowners
contracts the freedom of likely victims of gun-related  violence.  My focus in this Part is on
the conditions that facilitate the expansion of  particular  freedoms.  The expansion of those
particular freedoms necessarily means a contraction of some other set of freedoms.
12.  This paragraph draws on the more  expanded discussion in Michael J.  Kiarman,
Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties  Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1996).
See also Geoffrey D. Berman, Note, A New Deal  for Free Speech:  Free  Speech and  the Labor
Movement in the 1930s, 80 VA. L. REV. 291 (1994).
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and organizing. 3  Similarly in the  1950s  and  1960s,  free speech
became  intertwined  with  another  substantive  cause  that was
beginning to prosper-the Civil Rights Movement.14 Again, it is no
accident that many of the landmark free speech decisions  of the
Warren Court emanated from civil rights controversies. 5
The  Warren  Court's  criminal  procedure  revolution  may  be
another example of how particular freedoms expand when associ-
ated with substantive causes that are gaining in popularity. Most
criminal defendants  are poor, and a disproportionate number are
members  of minority racial groups. The  1960s witnessed  both  a
Civil Rights Movement and a War on Poverty. There is little doubt
that the Warren Court Justices thought about criminal procedure
issues in terms  of race and wealth  discrimination.'6  The  Court's
first forays into regulating state criminal procedure in the 1920s
and 1930s mainly came in cases of egregious mistreatment of black
defendants by the criminal justice system of southern states.  Yet
as late as the 1960s, at least some Justices continued to think about
criminal procedure cases in racial terms." Likewise, the connection
between criminal procedure rights and poverty could not be missed
in  cases  such  as  Gideon v.  Wainwright,9  and lay only  slightly
beneath the surface in cases like Miranda  v. Arizona. 2"
A second  explanation  for the  advance  of particular  freedoms
focuses on war. This connection is ironic, because in the short term,
wartime  exigencies  seem to  diminish freedom.  Examples  of this
13.  See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940);  Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
14.  See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).
15.  See, e.g.,  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963);  NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
16.  I have elaborated on this argument in Klarman, supra note 12, at 62-65.
17.  See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936);  Norris v. Alabama,  294 U.S.  587
(1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).  I have
investigated the connection between race  and the origins of modern criminal procedure at
greater length in Michael J. Klarman, The Racial  Origins  of  Modern Criminal  Procedure,  99
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2000).
18.  See BERNARD SCHWARTZ,  SUPERCHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREIE COURT-A
JUDIciAL BIOGRAPHY  591 (1983); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 673, 678, 750-51 (1992).
19.  372 U.S.  335 (1963).
20.  384 U.S. 436 (1966); see William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal  Procedure,
75 VA. L. REV. 761, 837-38 (1989).
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phenomenon abound. Military detention and trial of civilians was
widespread  during the Civil War.21  The  Sedition  and Espionage
Acts  of 1917-18  were  used  to  suppress  criticism  of the  Wilson
administration's  conduct  during  World  War  1.22  World  War  II
resulted in a massive interference  with the freedom of Japanese
Americans.23  The Cold War provided the occasion for substantial
impingements upon freedom of speech and due process. 2 4
Yet American wars also have produced longer term advances in
freedom,  especially  by  expanding  the  pool  of freedom's  benefi-
ciaries.
2' The Revolutionary War led to the First Emancipation  of
slaves  in  the  North  and  a  temporary  increase  in  individual
manumissions  in parts  of the  South.
2 '  The  Civil War  not  only
emancipated the slaves, but also expanded  the civil  and political
rights of the Freedmen.  It is no accident that women received the
right to  vote  through  federal  constitutional  amendment  during
World War 1.28 World War II was the proximate cause of the modern
Civil Rights  Movement.29  It  also proved a fruitful source  of fred
speech growth. Jehovah's Witnesses, for example, won the right to
abstain from saluting the flag during World War II-a right that
had been denied to them through the late 1930s.0 °
War may expand particular freedoms for a variety of reasons.
First, Americans tend to define their war aims in democratic terms.
21.  See, e.g., MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM  LINCOLN AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES (1991).
22.  See, e.g., PAULL. MURPHY, WORLD WAR IAND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1979).
23.  See, e.g.,  PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
24.  See, e.g., RICHARDM. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THEMCCARTHYERAINPERSPECTIVE
(1990).
25.  For a similar claim, see PHiP A. KLINNKER  & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY
MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999).
26.  See, e.g., ARTHURZILVERSMIT, THE FIRSTEMANCIPATION: THEABOLlTIONOFSLAVERY
IN THE NORTH 109-12, 117-19, 227-29 (1967).
27.  See, e.g., FONER, supra note 1, at 114-15, 223, 244-45,  255; JAMIEs M. MCPHERSON,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION  29-37 (1990).
28.  See ELEANOR  FLEXNER,  CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S  RIGHTS MOVEMENT
IN THi UNITED STATES 294 (1975).
29.  See,  e.g.,  JOHN  DIT  MER,  LOCAL  PEOPLE:  THE  STRUGGLE  FOR  CIVIL  RIGHTS  IN
MISSISSIPPI  ch.  1  (1994);  ADAM  FAIRCLOUGH,  RACE  &  DEMOCRACY:  THE  CIVIL  RIGHTS
STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1915-1972, at ch. 4 (1995).
30.  See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);  DAVID R.
MANWARING,  RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG-SALUTE  CONTROVERSY 72 (1962).
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World War I was the war "to make the world safe for democracy."
World War II was fought against fascism  and the multitude  of
unfreedoms it represented. How much the articulation of war aims
in  ideological  terms  affects  the  fate  of American  freedom  is  a
complex question that cannot be resolved here. It must be conceded
that most  white  Southerners  showed  remarkable  creativity  in
rationalizing  a war against  fascism while  preserving their  own
commitment  to  white  supremacy.3'  But  other  Americans,  less
heavily invested in the maintenance of Jim Crow, could not escape
the cognitive dissonance inherent in fighting against Nazi doctrines
of Aryan supremacy with a segregated army.2  The Supreme Court,
unable to reconcile the war's democratic ideology with the continued
disfranchisement of southern blacks, finally invalidated the white
primary in 1944."a The Court likewise invalidated sterilization  of
recidivist criminals with a disapproving, thinly veiled reference to
the eugenic experiments of Nazi scientists.34 Another Court ruling
in 1940 expanded the due process ban on coerced confessions with
a disparaging allusion to the law enforcement tactics of totalitarian
nations. 35 Finally, the Justices who invalidated the compulsory flag
salute in 1943 cannot have been oblivious to the fact that it was
Hitler  who first put Jehovah's  Witnesses  on the world map  by
persecuting them for refusing to heil the Fuhrer.6  Apparently, at
least  in the  chambers  of Supreme  Court  Justices, ideologically
articulated war aims force some reconciliation of national principles
with national practices.
Wars  also may advance the cause of certain freedoms through
their general dislocative effects. Wars, especially total ones like the
Civil War  and World  War II, undermine  traditional patterns  of
status and behavior. President Lincoln decided to emancipate and
31.  See, e.g., Johnpeter Horst Grill & Robert L. Jenkins, The Nazis and the American
South in the 1930s: A Mirror  Image?, 58 J. S. HIsT. 667 (1992).
32.  See, e.g., NEILR. MCMILLEN,  DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS  IN THE AGE OF
JIM  CROw  317  (1989);  Michael J.  Klarman,  Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 23-26  (1994) (citing sources).
33.  See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
34.  See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
35.  See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
36.  See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); MANWARING,
supra  note 30, at 30-31,  123, 154.
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then to arm the slaves  only after a year-long  effort to suppress
disunionism without  disrupting traditional  racial patterns  had
proved unavailing."  The women's  suffrage  movement, which for
nearly three-quarters  of a century had failed to secure a consti-
tutional  amendment  enfranchising  women,  finally  triumphed
during World  War  I, when military  conscription  and industrial
preparedness reduced  the male labor supply sufficiently to force
popular acceptance  of women  assuming nontraditional economic
and social roles.8  The extraordinary manpower demands created
by World War II likewise opened unprecedented civil and military
opportunities  for  African  Americans  and  thus  accelerated  the
breakdown of traditional patterns of racial subordination.39 Blacks
moved from South to North and from farm to city, creating new
opportunities  for the  exercise  of political power and the organi-
zation of social protest. African Americans returning from military
service were far less inclined to passively endure the oppressive
racial status quo. The disruption of world relations caused by the
war resulted in a new international order, in which Americans had
to choose between  altering their racial practices  and sacrificing
their pretensions to leadership of a largely nonwhite Third World
that had  some justification  for  identifying  American  capitalist
democracy with racial oppression.4 °
Finally, war usually involves common sacrifice for the general
good and thus has inescapably egalitarian implications. The sacri-
fices  of the  Freedmen  on  Civil  War  battlefields  helped  secure
postwar constitutional  amendments  guaranteeing basic civil and
political rights to African Americans.41 The contributions of women
on the home front during the First World War helped push the
women's suffrage movement over the top.42 The battlefield sacrifices
37.  See, e.g., DAVID HERBERT  DONALD, LiNCOLN ch. 13 (1995);  JAMES M. MCPHERSON,
BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA ch. 16 (1988).
38.  See FLEXNER, supra note 28, at 298-99.
39.  For the rest of this paragraph, see sources cited in Klarman, supra  note 32, at 14-23.
40.  See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation  as a Cold WarImperative,  41 STAN. L. REV.
61 (1988).
41.  See, e.g., WILLIAA  GILLETTE, THE RIGHTTOVOTE:  POLITICSAND THE PASSAGE OFTHE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT  81, 85 (1965); EARL M. MALTZ,  CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND CONGRESS,  1863-1869, at 6 (1990).
42.  See FLEXNER, supra  note 28, at 298-99.
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of American Catholics during that same war paved the way for their
accelerated  assimilation  into  the  nation's  cultural  mainstream
during the  1920s  and  1930s,  as  America's  unofficial  Protestant
establishment began slowly to crumble.'  If African Americans were
good enough to fight and die for their country during World War II,
surely  they  were  good  enough  to  vote  and to  deserve  federal
government  protection  against lynching and other racially moti-
vated violence."
Whatever the precise causal mechanism, American wars  often
have  advanced  the  cause  of particular  freedoms,  especially  by
expanding the pool of beneficiaries.
A perusal  of American  history suggests  a third way in which
particular freedoms expand-through a backlash effect generated
by  opponents  overplaying  their hand. Examples  are  plentiful;  I
shall limit myself to  a  few,  particularly  salient  instances.  The
Sedition  Act  of  1798,  deployed  aggressively  by  Federalists  to
suppress Republican criticism of the Adams administration, appar-
ently produced a backlash against seditious libel prosecutions and
in favor of a broader conception of free speech.45  Widespread mob
violence  against abolitionist  speakers  and newspaper  editors  in
northern states during the 1830s-including tarring and feathering,
destruction  of  printing  presses,  and  one  particularly  salient
murder-ultimately generated a backlash in favor of the free speech
rights of these antislavery agitators.46 A couple thousand criminal
prosecutions under the Espionage and Sedition Acts during World
War I-targeting  not only anarchists  and  communists,  but  also
socialists,  pacifists,  and  civil  libertarian  critics  of  the  Wilson
administration-inspired  the creation  of the American  Civil Lib-
erties  Union  and  probably  facilitated  the  Supreme  Court's  in-
auguration of modern First Amendment doctrine  a decade later.47
43.  See,  e.g.,  ROBERT  T.  HANDY,  UNDERMINED  ESTABLISHMENT:  CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS IN AMERICA,  1880-1920, at 189-90  (1991).
44.  See,  e.g.,  ROBERT  J.  NORRELL,  REAPING  THE  WHIRLWIND:  THE  CIVIL  RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE  57 (1985); NEIL A. WYNN,  THE AFRO-AMERICAN AND THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 29 (1976).
45.  See, e.g.,  LEONARD W. LEVY,  EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS chs. 9-10 (1985).
46.  See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious  History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery
Speech, Press, and  Petition  in 1835-37, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 785 (1995).
47.  See,  e.g.,  MURPHY,  supra note  22;  SAMUEL  WALKER,  IN  DEFENSE  OF AMERICAN
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Hitler and his Nazi Holocaust resulted in a dramatic expansion in
the freedom of American Jews after World War H.48 Perhaps the
most  famous  exemplar  of  this  backlash  phenomenon  is  the
mobilization of national opinion behind the enactment of landmark
civil rights legislation in 1964 and 1965 in direct response to the
televised scenes of police brutalization of civil rights demonstrators
in Birmingham and Selma, Alabama.49  It is possible that we are
witnessing a similar phenomenon today, as the notorious homo-
phobic murders  of Matthew Shepard in Wyoming and of Private
Barry Winchell at Fort Campbell, Kentucky may be generating a
backlash in favor of gay rights." 0
This backlash dynamic is ironic, but probably not surprising. It
is common wisdom that a profitable strategy in politics is to induce
one's  opponents to overplay their hand. The same is true in the
story of American freedom.
III. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
From a law professor's perspective, the most striking feature of
American  Freedom  may be the minimal role that courts play in the
story. I noticed just one reference to a court decision in the book's
first hundred pages, and that was to Dred  Scott, where the freedom
protected by the Court was that of Southerners to take their slaves
into the federal territories  (p. 75).  Courts  continue  to play a de
minimus role throughout the remainder of American  Freedom.  For
example, Brown v. Board of Education,  probably the most famous
case  in the history of the  United States  Supreme Court, is the
subject ofjust two index references; each is to a single sentence that
mentions the decision almost in passing (pp. 258-59,  314). Many
lawyers surely would criticize Foner for unduly minimizing the role
LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU chs. 1-2 (1990).
48.  See, e.g., EDWARD S. SHAPIRO,  ATIMEFORHEALING:AMERICAN JEWRYSINCE WORLD
WARI  chs. 1-2  (1992).
49.  See,  e.g.,  GLENN  T.  EsKEW,  BUT  FOR  BIRmINGHAM:  THE  LOCAL  AND  NATIONAL
MOVEMENTS  IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRuGGLE chs. 8-9 (1997); DAVID J. GARROw, PROTEST AT
SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 (1978);  Klarman,
supra  note 32, at 14149 (citing additional sources).
50.  See,  e.g.,  Kenneth  Sherrill  & Alan  Yang, From Outlaws to In-laws, Anti-Gay
Attitudes Thaw, 11 PUB.  PERSP. 20 (Jan. 2000).
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of courts in the story of American freedom. Yet I found his eschewal
of court fetishism  refreshing.  Leave it to  a  history professor  to
remind us lawyers that, in the grand scheme of things, courts have
played  a  relatively  marginal  role  in  the  history  of American
freedom. That is not to say no role at all, but rather a fairly small
one.
I have three points to make about the role of courts in the story
of American freedom. First, and most importantly, courts are less
important  to this  story than most  lawyers,  and probably many
historians  (though  not  Foner),  believe."'  One  reason  is  that
American history reveals that "courts love liberty most when it is
under pressure least."52 This insight should come as no surprise:
Judges are part of contemporary culture and thus are exceedingly
unlikely to interpret the Constitution in ways that depart dramat-
ically from contemporary public opinion.53 Examples of the Court
failing to intervene  on behalf of freedom when most  needed are
legion. The Supreme Court never lifted a finger against the most
massive  deprivation  of freedom  in  American  history,  African
American  slavery,  and  on  several  occasions  intervened  on  its
behalf. 54  Likewise,  the  Court  legitimized  segregation  and  dis-
franchisement  for much  of the Jim Crow era,55 upheld seditious
libel prosecutions  during World  War I,56  validated  the Japanese
American  internment during World  War  II,"  sanctioned  perse-
cution  of alleged  Communists  during the McCarthy  era, 5"  and
51.  For some typical statements, see the sources cited in Kiarman,  supra note 12, at 1-3
nn.1-14.
52.  John P. Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, in SUPREME COuRT AND SUPREME LAW
109, 114 (Edmond Cahn ed.,  1954).
53.  See generally Kiarman, supra  note 12.
54.  See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857);  Priggv. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536 (1842). See generally
William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820-
1860, 65 J. AM.  HIsT. 34 (1978).
55.  See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213
(1898);  Plessy v. Ferguson,  163 U.S. 537  (1896).  See generally Michael  J.  Klarman, The
Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV.  303.
56.  See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919);  Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919).
57.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
58.  See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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approved  sex  discrimination  until  after  the  emergence  of the
modern women's movement.59
Even when the Court has invoked the Constitution on behalf of
freedom causes that are widely celebrated today, as often as not it
has deployed an emerging  or existing national consensus to sup-
press outlier state practices. Many of the Court's most famous free-
dom decisions exemplify this paradigm:  Griswold v. Connecticut"
(striking down  a  state ban  on contraceptive  use,  as  applied  to
married couples); Gideon  v. Wainwright 6  (requiring state-appointed
defense counsel in all felony cases); Pierce v.  Society of Sisters"
(invalidating a state law barring children from attending private
school); Harper  v. Virginia  Board of Elections 63 (striking down the
poll  tax);  Nixon  v.  Herndon 64  (barring  a state-mandated  white
primary);  and  Moore  v.  City  of East Cleveland 65  (invalidating
legislation  denying certain blood relatives the right to live in a
single household).  In  all of these  cases,  the Court's ruling had
the  effect  of invalidating  laws in no more  than a small handful
of states;  additional  examples  easily  might  be  cited.  Invoking
the  Constitution  to  invalidate  extreme  outlier  practices  hardly
represents  a momentous  contribution  to the story of American
freedom.
Even in the civil rights context, where the conventional wisdom
regarding the instrumental role of courts in the story of American
freedom is especially entrenched,66 the judicial contribution is easily
59.  See, e.g., Hoytv. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaertv. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SexualEquality  Under  the Fourteenth  and  EqualRightsAmendments,
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 162-64.
60.  381  U.S.  479  (1965);  see Mary  L.  Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the
Connecticut  Supreme Court  Before Griswoldv. Connecticut, 75 IOWAL. REV. 915,920(1990).
61.  372 U.S. 335 (1963); see John F. Decker & Thomas J.  Lorigan, Comment, Right to
Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 103,
104(1970).
62.  268 U.S.  510  (1925); see WILLIAM  G. ROSS,  FORGING NEW  FREEDOMS: NATIVISM,
EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION,  1917-1927, at 134, 148 (1994).
63.  383 U.S. 663 (1966); see id. at 666 n.4.
64.  273 U.S. 536 (1927); see DARLENE CLARKHINE, BLACKVICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS 47-49 (1979).
65.  431 U.S.  494 (1977); see Robert A. Burt, The Constitution  of the Family, 1979 Sup.
CT. REV. 329, 391.
66.  See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A  DEDICATED  BAND OF
LAWYERS  FOUGHT FOR THE  CIVIL RIGHTS  REVOLUTION  (1994);  RICHARD  KLUGER,  SIMPLE
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exaggerated. Most of the Supreme Court's interventions on behalf
of African Americans  prior to World War II were limited in scope
and utterly trivial in consequence.67  Brown v. Board of Education,
the most celebrated  of all Court decisions, was rendered possible
only by the dramatic changes in racial attitudes and practices set
in motion by the New Deal  and World War 11.68  A decade or two
earlier,  when  a decision  invalidating  public  school  segregation
would  have been dramatically  countermajoritarian  (and almost
certainly unenforceable),69  the Justices did not seriously think of
rendering  it.70  Nor, once  decided,  did Brown produce  significant
results until the national political branches had mobilized behind
it.7l That development was a product of the Civil Rights Movement,
not Brown, and the one had less to do with the other than is tradi-
tionally  assumed.72  None  of this is  to  deny, however,  that the
NAACP's litigation campaign played a significant role in mobilizing
African Americans  to protest the racial status quo, or that early
Court victories may have provided an inspirational ray of hope in
an otherwise barren landscape.  It  is to say that Court decisions,
including Brown, played relatively little role in undermining Jim
Crow  practices  and  that the critical  battles  of the  Civil  Rights
Movement were  fought  on  the  streets  of southern  cities,  not  in
courtrooms.
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OFBROWNV. BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND  BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY (1976).
67.  Both the  cases and their  consequences are discussed in Klarman, supra  note 55;
Michael J. Kiarman, Race and the Court  in the Progressive  Era,  51 VAND.  L. REV. 881 (1998);
Klarman, supra note 17.
68.  See Klarman, supra note 32, at 7-75.
69.  See MICHAELJ. KLARMAN, NEITHER HERO,  NORVILLAIN: THE SUPREME COURT, RACE
ANDTHE CONSTITUTIONiNTHETWENTIETH  CENTURY ch. 3 (forthcoming) (manuscript at  48-51,
62-63, on file with William and Mary Law Review).
70.  See Gong Lumv. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Memorandum ofWilliam 0. Douglas (Jan.
25,  1960),  in The  DOUGLAS LETTERS:  SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE  PAPERS OF JUSTICE
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS  169 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.,  1987) (noting a Frankfurter statement in
1960 to the effect that he would have voted to uphold segregation in the 1940s had such a
case reached the Court, because "public opinion had not then crystallized against it").
71.  See, e.g.,  GERALD N. ROSENBERG,  THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS  BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? chs. 2-3 (1991).
72.  I have developed this argument at some length in Klarman, supra  note 32, at 75-150.
73.  See, e.g., Klarman, supra  note 67, at 946-52; Klarman, supra  note 17 (manuscript at
43-45, on file with William and Mary Law Review).
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Recent advances in the freedom of women and gays and lesbians
even more  obviously have been secured  without any  significant
contribution from the Court. The women's  liberation movement
already had become a vibrant force in national politics before the
Justices invalidated their first sex classification in 1971.74 Though
the Court did strike down many more such laws over the ensuing
decade,7 5 most of these interventions were relatively trivial in their
implications-chopping  down  some dead legislative  wood  is  not
much of an overstatement.71 Moreover, the Court declined to inter-
vene  against  legislation  embracing  some  of the  most harmful
sex  stereotypes, 77  and, in  one  remarkable  decision,  denied  that
pregnancy classifications  were sex related.78  Similarly, dramatic
advances  in the freedom  of gays  and lesbians secured  over the
past few decades  have been won almost entirely without judicial
assistance. 79
Again,  none of this is to  deny that occasionally the Supreme
Court does strike blows in defense of freedoms that do not enjoy
majoritarian  support. Clearly, the Court's decisions  invalidating
school  prayer  or  flag-burning  prohibitions  and  protecting  the
procedural  rights  of  criminal  suspects  have  not  commanded
majority support.80  Yet even with regard to these decisions, it is
important to  appreciate the limits of the Court's inclination and
capacity  to frustrate  majority opinion.  The Justices  invalidated
school prayer and Bible reading only after the relative demise of the
nation's unofficial Protestant establishment, 81 and these decisions
74.  See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
75.  See, e.g., MississippiUniv. forWomen v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craigv. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.  677 (1973).
76.  See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F.  POWELL, JR. 511 (1994).
77.  See, e.g., Rostkerv. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981).
78.  See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
79. Romer  v.  Evans,  517  U.S.  620  (1996),  is  the  only  Supreme  Court  decision
guaranteeing the equal protection rights of gays and lesbians, and it invalidated an obvious
outlier statute.
80.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989);  Miranda v. Arizona,  384 U.S. 436
(1966); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).  For the polls on flag burning and school prayer,
see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial  Review,  91 MICH. L. REv.  577, 606 n.142, 608
n.155 (1993).
81.  See Kiarman, supra note 12, at 46-62.
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were  widely  defied  in  practice. 2 Likewise,  the  Warren  Court's
criminal  procedure  revolution  was  rendered  possible  only  by
shifting public attitudes toward race, poverty, and totalitarian law
enforcement practices;83 subsequent Courts have significantly re-
trenched upon it,8 4 and the practical effect of decisions expanding
the freedom of criminal suspects has been largely blunted by the
unwillingness of legislatures to adequately fund defense counsel.8 5
Second,  to the  limited extent that judicial decisions  have in-
fluenced the story of American freedom, they have been as likely to
hinder as to advance the cause of particular liberties. This point is
directly related to one made earlier: Because the concept of freedom
plausibly can be invoked on either side of virtually any historical
controversy, when  the  Court advances  one  brand of freedom, it
necessarily infringes upon another. For example, when the Court
defends under the First Amendment the freedom of affluent people
to  spend  money  on  influencing  elections,86  it  undermines  the
freedom of other people to enjoy an electoral process uncorrupted by
the influence of money. A court that defends the right of gun owners
to  keep and bear  arms  simultaneously  abridges  the freedom  of
persons living in high-crime urban areas to enjoy lives unimpaired
by the constant fear of gun-related  violence. When  the Supreme
Court defends the freedom of women to control their reproduction
through abortion,87 it nullifies the freedom of fetuses to live. Once
one  concedes  that  freedom  has a positive  as  well as  a negative
component, as discussed above, an advance for one freedom cause
necessarily represents a setback for another.
Even  setting this  point  aside and  focusing  on one  particular
brand of freedom,  calculating  whether courts  have advanced  or
82.  See, e.g., FRANKJ. SoRAUF, THE WALLOF SEPARATION: THE  CONSTITUTIONALPoLITICS
OF CHURCH  AND  STATE 296-300  (1976);  H. Frank Way, Jr., Survey Research on Judicial
Decisions:  The Prayer  and Bible Reading Cases, 21 W. POL. Q. 189 (1968).
83.  See Klarman, supra note 12, at 62-66.
84.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Leon,  468 U.S. 897  (1984) (establishing the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (recognizing
the exigent circumstances exception to Miranda  warnings).
85.  See William J.  Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship  Between Criminal  Procedure  and
Criminal  Justice,  107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997).
86.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
87.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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retarded its cause over the course of American history is extremely
complicated. For example, has the Supreme Court been more of a
help or a hindrance to the cause of African American liberation over
the past two centuries? The answer seems genuinely uncertain to
me. On the one hand, the Supreme Court struck many early blows
against  the  "legal  lynchings"  of  black  criminal  defendants,"
gradually chipped away at southern state mechanisms for disfran-
chising blacks, 9 and invalidated (eventually) racial segregation in
housing and public education.9 " On the other hand, the same Court
also invalidated northern personal liberty laws designed to protect
free blacks from kidnapping by slavecatchers,91 voided Congress's
effort to restrict the spread of slavery into federal territories while
simultaneously denying that even free blacks possessed any rights
"which the white  man was bound to respect,"92 struck down the
1875 Civil Rights Act provision guaranteeing blacks "full and equal"
access to public accommodations,93 legitimized racial segregation
and black disfranchisement for many decades early in the twentieth
century,94 and in the last decade or so has invalidated numerous
affirmative  action plans and minority voting districts  ostensibly
designed to benefit African Americans.95 It is by no means certain
how one should evaluate this balance sheet. At a minimum, the
Court plainly is not the unvarnished defender of racial minorities
that it sometimes has been cracked up to be.
Thus, even if one believes that courts have made a larger con-
tribution  to  the  story  of American  freedom  than  I previously
88.  See supra  note 17.
89.  See, e.g.,  Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,  383 U.S. 663 (1966); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S.  536 (1927);  Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
90.  See, e.g., Brown v. Board of  Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
91.  See Priggv. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
92.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.  (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
93.  See The Civil Rights Cases,  109 U.S. 3 (1883).
94.  See, e.g.,  Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S.  45 (1935);  Giles v. Harris,  189 U.S.  475
(1903); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
95.  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shawv. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993).
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allowed,  it remains  uncertain  whether they  are more  likely  to
advance  or to retard the cause of any particular freedom.  Is there
anything further to be said about which sorts of freedom courts are
likely to champion, or is this simply a crapshoot? Given the contest-
ability of what counts as a valid source of constitutional law and the
rampant  indeterminacy characteristic  of the  constitutional text,
courts probably can marshal adequate "legal" support for advancing
just about any freedom cause they are likely to cherish, assuming
the  requisite  backing  for  that  cause  in  contemporary  popular
opinion.96 But which brands of freedom are likely to resonate best
with courts? Because judges are products of contemporary culture,
their freedom commitments are likely to reflect in a general way
contemporary  attitudes  toward  freedom.  For example,  both the
Supreme Court's validation  of racial  segregation in 1896 and its
invalidation  in  1954  generally  reflected  contemporary  attitudes
regarding the appropriate scope of freedom for African Americans."
Yet courts are not perfect mirrors of contemporary mores. At a
minimum,  Supreme  Court  Justices  differ  from  the  average
American in three ways: they are more likely to be lawyers, to be
well  educated,  and  to be  relatively  affluent.9 8  These  systematic
differences  undoubtedly  influence the  sorts  of freedom that the
Supreme Court is likely to deem worthy of constitutional protection.
Lawyers tend to value process, and Supreme Court Justices histor-
ically have been more protective of the procedural rights of criminal
defendants  than has public  opinion.99  Well-educated  people,  ac-
cording to contemporary opinion polls, have systematically different
attitudes toward abortion, school prayer, and gay rights than the
average member  of society. 00  And the Supreme Court has been
96.  For numerous examples of the indeterminacy of the constitutional text, see Michael
J. Kiarman, Fidelity,  Indeterminacy,  and the Problem  of ConstitutionalEvil,  65 FORDHAM L.
REV.  1739  (1997).  For  the disagreement  over  the permissible  sources  of constitutional
interpretation,  see  LOUIS  MICHAEL  SEIDMAN,  OUR  UNSETrLED  CoNSTrrUTION:  A NEW
DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND JUDIcIAL REVIEW ch.  1 (forthcoming 2001).
97.  See Klarman, supra note 32; Klarman, supra note 55.
98.  I  have further  developed this point about the culturally  elite biases inherent in
judicial review in Michael J. Klarman, What's So GreatAbout  Constitutionalism?,  93 Nw. U.
L. REV.  145, 189-91 (1998).
99.  Miranda  probably is the best exemplar of this phenomenon, though dozens of other
cases corroborate the point.
100.  See Klarman,  supra note 98, at 190 n.245.
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more willing  to  protect  abortion rights, bar school  prayer,  and
invalidate  antigay legislation than the average American appar-
entlywould like.'0 ' Finally, affluent people are more likely to oppose
wealth  redistribution  than the  median voter.  Historically,  the
Supreme  Court  frequently  has  checked  legislative  efforts  to
redistribute wealth,1 0 2  and on only the rarest of occasions has it
attempted  to  coerce  redistribution,  and  even  then  in  only  the
mildest of forms.' 0 3
Thus, while courts have not played a tremendously significant
role  in  the  history  of  American  freedom,  their  interventions
predictably  have  favored  those  freedoms  that  affluent,  well-
educated lawyers tend to value, rather than those touted by less
affluent, less well-educated  lay people.  In  a nutshell, we  should
hardly be  surprised  that  the  Supreme  Court has  offered  solid
support for  the  freedom  to read  books  and  to  express  political
opinions, 0 4 but has done essentially nothing to advance the freedom
to keep and bear arms."5
Finally, not only have court decisions played a relatively small
role in  the story  of American  freedom, and retarded  as often as
they have advanced the cause of particular freedoms, but they also
have sometimes produced extremely unpredictable  consequences.
Observers probably have been too quick to assume that when courts
intervene on the side of a particular freedom, its cause is reliably
advanced. Yet Supreme  Court decisions  often  produce the most
bizarre consequences. Consider a few of the most salient historical
101.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.  620 (1996); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113 (1973);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).  The gay rights example is complicated by the fact that
Supreme  Court  Justices  are  also  significantly  older  than  the  average  American,  a
demographic fact that cuts against tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality.  On this culture
war issue, then, the bias toward liberal attitudes produced by the Justices' greater education
and relative affluence is at least partially offset by the bias toward conservative attitudes
produced by their greater age.
102.  See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Pollock v. Farmers Loan
& Trust Co.,  158 U.S. 601 (1895);  Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
See  generally ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT chs. 3-6 (2d ed. 1994).
103.  See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.  371 (1971);  Harper v. Virginia State Bd.,
383 U.S.  663 (1966);  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.  335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
104.  See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444(1969).
105.  Revealingly, there is no canonical citation to use here.
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examples. Prigg  v. Pennsylvania," 6  which invalidated a personal
liberty law as inconsistent with the Fugitive Slave Act, apparently
inspired northern states to enact even more aggressive statutes to
protect their free black citizens from kidnapping, thus evading or
in some instances outright defying the Court's mandate. 1 0 7 Dred
Scott v. Sandford mainly served to mobilize Republicans in defense
of the legitimacy of their party, which the Court essentially had
ruled unconstitutional by invalidating congressional prohibitions on
slavery in the federal territories.0 8 Miranda v. Arizona not only
expanded the freedom of criminal suspects, but also helped elect
Richard Nixon president in 1968, thus leading to the appointment
of federal judges  less  sympathetic to that freedom.'0 9 The  most
dramatic short term impact of Brown v. Board of  Education  was to
crystallize southern white resistance to changes in the racial status
quo and thus to propel southern politics sharply to the right."  0 Roe
v.  Wade not only announced  a constitutional right to abortion but
also mobilized  a right-to-life  opposition  that continues to play a
prominent role in American politics to the present day."'  Within
the  last  decade,  the  most  palpable  consequence  of the  Hawaii
Supreme Court decision invalidating a ban on gay marriage 12 has
been to mobilize thirty state legislatures  and  Congress to enact
statutes  reaffirming  the  traditional  heterosexual  limitation  on
marriage.1
Thus,  even  if  court  decisions  matter  more  to  the  story  of
American  freedom  than I  have  acknowledged,  evaluating  their
overall consequences is a formidable task. Landmark Court deci-
sions often seem to mobilize political opposition  as effectively  as
106.  41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
107.  See, e.g.,  THOMAS D. MORRIS,  FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS  OF THE
NORTH,  1780-1861  (1974);  Paul  Finkelman,  Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State
Courts:  Anti-Slavery Use of  a Pro-Slavery  Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5, 21-35  (1979).
108.  See,  e.g.,  DON  E. FEHRENBACHER,  THE  DRED  SCOTT  CASE:  ITS  SIGNIFICANCE  IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 561-67 (1978).
109.  See FRED P.  GRAHAM,  THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND chs. 8, 12-13 (1970).
110.  See Kiarman, supra note 32, at 75-150.
111.  See, e.g., JEFFRIES, supra  note 76, at 354-59; ROSENBERG, supra note 71, at 188,341-
42.-
112.  See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
113.  See, e.g., Hanna Rosin &  Pamela Ferdinand, GaysAchieve Breakthrough  in Vermont,
WASH.  POST, Mar. 17, 2000, at Al.
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they advance the cause of freedom that the Court has identified for
constitutional protection.
The  story of American freedom is complex, multifaceted,  and
filled with ironic twists and turns. The  concept  of freedom  has
proven sufficiently malleable to accommodate both (or all) sides of
virtually  every  significant  historical  controversy.  The  tension
between positive and negative conceptions of freedom, and between
a  conceptioii  grounded  in individual  zones  of autonomy  and  a
competing  notion  rooted  in the  right  of  political  majorities  to
democratic self-governance, virtually ensures that all contestants
will carry their own freedom banner into battle. This is not to say
that all claims to freedom will be equally convincing.  It  is to say
that any particular claim must be adjudicated on the merits of the
posited freedom,  rather than on whether the claim  satisfies the
criteria for a valid freedom argument.
Particular freedoms  expand over time for a variety of reasons.
Freedoms that become popularly associated with attractive sub-
stantive causes, like the Civil Rights Movement, tend to prosper.
Freedoms  relating  to  equality  and democracy  seem  to  expand
during wartime, as a result of ideologically-articulated  war aims,
the disruption of traditional patterns of behavior and status that
war produces, and the egalitarian implications of equal sacrifice for
the common good. Particular freedoms also seem to advance when
their opponents are provoked into extreme forms of resistance.
Finally, the role of courts in the story of American freedom is
complex  and  perhaps  counterintuitive.  Judges  are  too  much  a
product  of their cultural milieu to make more than a marginal
contribution to American freedom. Because of the infinite malle-
ability of the concept of freedom, moreover,  court decisions  that
advance one brand of freedom are certain to retard another. Courts
are likeliest to promote the freedom causes that resonate with the
culturally elite biases of well-educated, relatively affluent lawyers.
Yet, because court decisions often mobilize intense political oppo-
sition, their overall effect may be to hinder as much as to promote
the freedoms identified for judicial protection.
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The  only  obvious  lesson  to  draw  from the story  of American
freedom is that the subject is a great deal more complicated than it
initially appears.